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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, HARSCO/HECKETT and 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA/AETNA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 860086 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Plaintiff entitled to receive additional 
disability benefits - either temporary total, temporary par-
tial or permanent partial or permanent total - above and 
beyond the statutory maximum set forth in Section 35-1-67 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) which benefit has heretofore been 
fully paid by the defendants? 
2. Has the Plaintiff fully exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies before the Industrial Commission by not 
seeking continuing permanent total disability benefits under 
the provisions of Section 35-1-67? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with Plaintiff's statement of facts in-
sofar as it is supported by the record of this case. In 
addition to Plaintiff's statement of facts, the defendants 
wish to add the following: 
The Defendant insurance carrier in response to a dis-
ability evaluation by the treating physician who advised 
that plaintiff's permanent partial impairments totaled 79% 
determined that becase of the severity of the injuries he 
sustained and the extremely high partial impairments that 
resulted "... would denote a permanent total disability 
rating." (R.7) 
Plaintiff was fully advised of all of his rights and 
the benefits he would receive. Defendant explained plain-
tiff would receive the statutory maximum of $61f152.00 from 
the defendants. (R.7). Plaintiff was further advised of the 
possibility of Second Injury Fund benefits and informed the 
plaintiff to contact the Second Injury Fund. The letter was 
dated January 6, 1984. (R.7). After contact in March, 
1984, defendant advised plaintiffs counsel of benefits avail-
able from defendant and recommended contact with the Indust-
rial Commission. (R.10). The Industrial Commission's legal 
counsel responding to a letter from the office of the Gover-
nor, advised plaintiff of the benefits defendant was 
required to pay and recommended further the possibility 
existed for "lifetime benefits." (R.ll). In September, 
1985, plaintiff filed an Application for Hearing in which 
defendants Harsco/Heckett and Insurance Co. of North 
America/Aetna only, were named and in which Plaintiff 
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claimed "Defendants have denied liability for permanent par-
tial." (R.16). It must be noted that the Second Injury 
Fund was not named as a party. 
Defendant responded to the Application for Hearing by 
outlining the benefits that have been paid and will be paid 
in the future and again recommending the claim be processed 
against the Second Injury Fund. (R.18). 
The administrative law judge issued his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on the 18th day of 
December, 1985 in which Order he declared there was no fact-
ual dispute and indicating a hearing was unnecessary (R.24). 
On December 19, 1985 plaintiffs counsel agreed that a hear-
ing was unnecessary and the matter could be decided on a 
stipulated set of facts. Plaintiffs statement of the issue 
in this case "... was whether or not the carrier can be 
liable for two 312 weeks of compensation, or whether the 
carrier is liable for one 312 week period of compensation." 
(R.28). 
The administrative law judge made a finding that "to 
his credit, the Applicant has returned to work and under 
these circumstances the statute mandates that he be paid 
permanent partial disability benefits subject to the limit-
ations set forth in section 35-1-67 (R.25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Assuming the finding of the administrative law 
judge was correct that the plaintiff was not in fact perm-
anently and totally disabled because plaintiff had returned 
to work and was only entitled to permanent partial dis-
ability benefits, defendant has in fact overpaid plaintiff. 
Section 35-1-67 provides in part "... in case the par-
tial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the 
total period of compensation." Later, this same section pro-
vides "... the amounts specified in this section are all sub-
ject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amounts pay-
able as specified in this section, and in no event shall 
more than a maximum weekly amounts payable as specified in 
this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 
66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required 
to be paid." 
Plaintiff received 170-3/7 weeks of temporary total 
through January 16, 1984 or $39,198.57. The maximum total 
period of compensation by this section is 312 weeks at 
66-2/3% of the states average weekly wage or $47,736.00. 
The balance remaining to be paid on January 16, 1984 was the 
difference between 312 weeks - the maximum permanent partial 
- and 170-3/7 weeks already paid as temporary total compen-
sation. This amounts to 141-4/7 weeks at the permanent par-
tial rate of $153.00 per week or $21,660.00. 
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2. Plaintiff is not entitled to two periods of com-
pensation totaling 312 weeks for temporary total and 312 
weeks of permanent partial. 
Section 35-1-65 Utah Code Annotated (1953) limits 
the periods of temporary total to not over 312 weeks in a 
period of eight years. The limitation is a restriction as 
to a time period of 312 weeks which may be paid any time 
during an eight year period (underscoring added). 
Plaintiff must agree that all payments of temp-
orary total must stop on the maximum medical improvement 
date determined by the treating phsyician. This date was 
December 5, 1983 and all payments after that date had to 
have been something other than temporary total compensation. 
3. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies through failure to join the Second Injury 
Fund who may well have some liability after the payment of 
compensation ends by this defendant. 
Plaintiff has relied on a statement in the record 
that plaintiff has been rehabilitated and returned to work 
and the administrative law judges volunteered finding that 
plaintiff has returned to work as precluding payments from 
the Second Injury Fund. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL 
AND/OR PERMANENT PARTIAL OR PERMANENT 
TOTAL BENEFITS BUT NOT TO EXCEED A 
COMBINED TOTAL OF 312 WEEKS 
Section 35-1-65 Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides in 
part. 
"(1) In case of temporary disability, the 
employee shall receive 66-2/3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long 
as such disability is total .... but not to 
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. In no case shall such 
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the 
late of 100% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury over a period of eight 
years from the date of the injury." (under-
scoring added). 
The above section is basically the only provision deal-
ing with "temporary disability" and providing a benefit 
"so long as such disability is total." 
In this case, the Plaintiff sustained grievous 
injuries which required a long period of convalescence. 
In fact, the period was almost 3-1/2 years. 
The treating physician, Dr. Douglas Schow, Jr., deter-
mined on December 5, 198 3 the Plaintiff to have combined 
disabilities of "... 79% permanent disability ..." as a 
"result of a combination of the above injuries as I have 
tried to outline for you. It is not expected that Mr. 
Johnson will have any significant improvement in the 
future in the above injuries." (R.6). 
The foregoing statement did two things in this case. 
(1) temporary total disability no longer existed, and (2) 
all future benefits would be chargeable to some other sec-
tion or sections of the workers compensation act. 
The defendant elected to use a later date - January 
16, 1984 - as the termination date of temporary total. 
The plaintiff had received continuous payments of tempor-
ary total of 170 weeks and 3 days at $230.00 per wek for a 
total of $39,198.57. 
From this date, January 16, 1984, forward, the plain-
tiff's remedy for continuing benefits would be under the 
provisions of Section 35-1-66 Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
(Partial Disability - Scale of Payments) or Section 
35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated (1953), (Permanent Total 
Disability - Amount of Payments). 
Judge Sumsion in his findings determined that "the pay-
ments were made at the permanent total disability rate on 
the assumption the Applicant would be permanently and 
totally disabled but in fact he is not. To his credit, 
the Applicant has returned to work and under these circum-
stances the statute mandates that he be paid permanent 
partial disability benefits subject to the limitations 
set forth in Section 35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated." (R.25). 
The administrative law judge went outside the section 
dealing with permanent partial disability and jumped to 
-7-
section 35-1-67 which deals with permanent total dis-
ability. Section 35-1-66 provides in part: 
"In case the partial disability begins after a 
period of total disability, the period of total 
disability shall be deducted from the total 
period of compensation." 
Applying this section strictly to the facts in the 
instant case, we have the following: 
Maximum period of compensation: 312 weeks. 
Less temporary total comp. paid: 170-4/7 wks. 
Balance available for permanent 
partial payment: 141-3/7 wks. 
The agreed permanent partial rating was 79% (R.6). 
This amounts to 79% of 312 weeks or 246-4/7 weeks. How-
ever, there are only 141-3/7 weeks of permanent partial 
available for payment. This totals $21,660.00. Plaintiff 
received $39,198.57 as temporary total and $21,053.43 in 
addition as permanent total compensation. It would appear 
that Plaintiff may well have been shorted $616.57. How-
ever, the additional qualification appears later in Section 
35-1-66. 
Section 35-1-66 Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides the 
additional caveat: 
"The amounts specified in this section are all 
subject to the limitations as to the weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and 
in no event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compen-
sation be required to be paid." 
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Again, applying the facts in this case, the following 
calculations appear in terms of dollars: 
Maximum available - Section 35-1-66 
312 weeks at $153.00: $47,736.00 
Paid as temporary total 170-3/7 weeks 
at $230.00: 39,198.57 
Maximum available for permanent partial: 8,537.43 
The defendants herein believed the above interpretation 
and application of Section 35-1-66 would be unconscionable 
and in no way reflective of the serious and disabling 
nature of plaintiffs injuries. 
Plaintiff, therefore, elected to skip to Section 
35-1-67 (Permanent Total - Amount of Payments) to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the maximum benefits available by 
law because of the severely disabling nature of plaintiff's 
injuries. 
There is in fact no conflict in the interpretation of 
Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and 35-1-67 read separately or 
jointly. 
Section 35-1-65 (Temporary Disability) defines what 
temporary total disability is and the limits of payment. 
The statutory maximum is 312 weeks of temporary total at 
the current weekly maximum rate per week. This amount may 
be collected at any time the worker is totally disabled 
during an eight year period. The limit is in dollars. 
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Section 35-1-66 (Partial Disability - Scale of Pay-
ments) provides for a schedule of payments for specific 
losses and the means of arriving at fair percentages of 
loss. AGain, there are the same limitations on dollar 
amounts and credit to be given for compensation paid as 
temporary total from the maximum of 312 weeks. 
Section 35-1-67 (Permanent Total Disability) again pro-
vides for a schedule of payments at a different amount than 
the other two with credit being given for all payments made 
of temporary total and permanent partial but with the same 
limitations of a dollar amount based upon the same 312 week 
period. This section specifically recognizes the other two 
and places the same 312 week limit on combined impairments. 
The three statutes have been essentially the same since 
1917. Some modifications have occurred over the years but 
almost exclusively with reference to amounts or the sched-
ule of benefits. 
The dearth of case law on this subject is the best 
indication that the language of the statutes is clear, un-
ambiguous or non-contradictory. The administrative agency 
has no problem in treating all injured workers fairly and 
equally so that all receive the same benefits provided by 
law. 
If the benefits are inadequate, the remedy is the legis-
lature and not the courts. 
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Plaintiff has received all of the weekly compenstaion 
benefits these defendants are required to pay under any or 
all of the provisions of Sections 35-1-65r 35-1-66 and 
35-1-67 Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO FULLY EXHAUST 
HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY NOT SEEKING 
FURTHER AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FROM THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
Before these defendants had exhausted the permanent 
total payments, the plaintiff was seeking further and 
additional benefits. 
On January 4, 1984, defendants advised plaintiff of its 
decision that for all intents and purposes, plaintiff was 
permanently and totally disabled, agreeing to pay the stat-
utory maximum and advising plaintiff to seek further and 
possibly additional benefits from the Second Injury Fund 
(R.7). The Second Injury Fund was copied with the corres-
pondence and supplied copies of everything thereafter. 
In two months, plaintiff had sought counsel and began 
the claim against these defendants. Plaintiff's counsel 
was advised to discuss the matter with counsel for the 
Industrial Commission (R.10). In September, 1984 plaintiff 
sought help through the office of the Governor. Again, 
the suggestion was made to involve the Second Injury Fund. 
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In September, 1985, the current action was brought and 
again the Second Injury Fund was not involved or noticed. 
(R.15). 
By Answer filed on October 3, 1985, the suggestion was 
made to join the Second Injury Fund (R.19). Again, no 
response. 
The matter was finally submitted without hearing and of 
course no notice was given to the Second Injury Fund. 
(R.29). 
Plaintiff has simply accepted as fact the statement of 
the administrative law judge that "the payments were made 
at the permanent total disability rate on the assumption 
the application would be permanently and totally disabled 
but in fact he is not." 
The judge presumed something not in evidence. Defend-
ants advised plaintiff in January, 1984 "... we are aware 
that you have been in a re-training process and may be able 
to return to some occupation as a result of that re-train-
ing; however, based upon the permanent disability rating 
given, we would need to regard your condition as permanent 
and total ..." (R.7). 
Defendants assumed nothing. Plaintiff had a high 
impairment rating (79%) and was in retraining. For all 
intents and purposes, he was in vocational rehabilitation. 
Section 35-1-67 provides in part: 
"The division of vocational rehabilitation shall 
at the termination of the vocational training of 
the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
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sion of Utah, the work the employee is qualified 
to perform and thereupon the commission shall 
after notice to the employer, and on opportunity 
to be heard, determine whether the employee has 
notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a 
loss of bodily function ... 
.... in all other cases where there has been 
rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based 
upon partial permanent disability." (under-
scoring added). 
It is rather obvious that the re-training or rehab-
ilitation has been effective because the plaintiff has 
returned to work. 
There is no question about the loss of bodily function 
because it is still severe (79%). 
There is no question but what these defendants have 
discharged their liabilities in full having paid 312 weeks 
of compensation. 
There is also no question but what the statute limits 
the liability of the employer and insurance carrier but 
does not limit the liability of the Second Injury Fund. 
There is also no question but what Section 35-1-67 pro-
vides for payments from the Second Injury Fund and has no 
statute of limitation. 
I feel that the plaintiff is pursuing the wrong party 
in attempting to receive further benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision should be upheld in denying 
plaintiff further or additional compensation benefits from 
these defendants and that plaintiff seek appropriate admin-
istrative steps to pursue other remedies available to him 
to possibly receive further and additional compensation. 
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